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Abstract 
This paper looks at the gains from improved market efficiency in long-distance grain trade in the 
second half of the 19th century when violations of the law of one price were reduced due to 
improved information transmission. Two markets, a major export centre, Chicago, and a major 
importer, Liverpool, are analyzed. We show that there was a law of one price equilibrium 
throughout the period but that markets displayed spells of demand- or supply-constrained trade 
when the law of one price was violated. Over time adjustments back to equilibrium, as measured by 
the half-life of a shock, become faster, violations of the law of one price become smaller and hence 
less persistent. There were also significant gains from improved market efficiency but that 
improvement took place after the information ‘regime’ shifted from pre-telegraphic communication 
to a regime with swift transmission of information in an era which developed a sophisticated 
commercial press and telegraphic communication. Improved market efficiency probably stimulated 
trade more than falling transport costs. 
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 1. Introduction 
One important insight from historical analysis of market integration is that long distance trade often 
takes place out of the (transport and transaction cost adjusted) law of one price equilibrium.3 That 
is, the law of one price is violated, which will affect the volume of trade relative to its equilibrium 
value. The major source of violations of the law of one price was unreliable and slowly travelling 
information over long distances. In pre telegraph times a message from Chicago to Liverpool and 
back would take three to four weeks, but the telegraph shortened that transmission time to a few 
hours. A flourishing commercial press and a reliable postal system made what used to be 
exclusively or privately held knowledge into publicly accessible information. With the telegraph the 
speed at which information travelled became dramatically shorter than the speed of transporting 
goods for the first time in history. 
 
Persson (1999) and  Ejrnæs and Persson (2000) showed that over the last five centuries market 
performance improved gradually as measured by the speed at which deviations are reversed or 
corrected. The half-life of shocks to the law of one price in long distance trade has declined between 
1500 and 1900 from years to days. The process of improved market efficiency gained momentum in 
the 19th century with faster and more reliable means of information transmission. This conclusion is 
controversial given the evidence that aggregate price indices adjust slowly in international 
comparative studies. Others argue that there has been no or little decrease in the magnitude of 
deviations from the law of one price over very long stretches of time (Rogoff et al 2001). In this 
literature results on the half-life of shocks up to a year or more are frequently reported. (Giovanini 
1988). However, many of these studies rely on yearly or quarterly averaged price data which 
conceal the day to day adjustments and hence introduce a serious downward bias to the estimates 
(Taylor 2001).4 This study uses weekly observations of spot prices of one commodity, wheat, and 
transport costs. 
 
Another insight from historical market integration studies is that the law of one price equilibrium is 
rarely obtained as a stable state. It should rather be seen as an ‘attractor equilibrium’, that is a state 
                                                 
3 This paper uses the same methodology as our Discussion paper  05-02 but the data have been improved and the new 
results are more robust. Comments from participants at the economic history seminar at Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, from 
Paul Sharp and Cormac O’Gràda are gratefully acknowledged. 
4 A downward bias in the estimates implies an upward bias in the estimate of the half-life of shocks.  
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to which the price reverses after a shock to equilibrium or an ongoing reversal process. This view 
also relies on a different view of the tâtonnement process. It is not one in which sellers and buyers 
exchange trade bids and counter-bids before they reach an equilibrium price at which they trade. 
The tâtonnement process here is one where trade takes place, albeit on a constrained level, out of 
equilibrium. Either buyers chase sellers who ration the supply - a case of excess demand – or sellers 
chase buyers who ration their purchases – a case of excess supply, in which prices are traded down. 
The contemporary commercial press, from which the price and transport cost data used in this study 
are collected, see Appendix 1 for details, give sample evidence of trade taking place outside 
equilibrium. The press repeatedly reported periods of excess supply and in a sequence of trading 
sessions you can actually trace the tâtonnement process when sellers chase buyers eventually giving 
in so that prices gradually fall in subsequent trading sessions. The press and business journals 
recorded prices and the state of the market as ’quiet’ or ‘busy’, ´dull’ or ‘lively’ indicating not only 
the volume but also the ‘mood’ of trade.  Occasionally the recorded price was characterized as 
‘nominal’, indicating that it was not associated with trade at all but just repeated from the preceding 
session and often the volume of trade was reported as below normal, that is equilibrium, trade.  
 
The principal new problems addressed in this paper, having first demonstrated the existence of a 
(transport and transaction cost adjusted) law of one price equilibrium, henceforward LOOP, is   
1. to measure the costs of imperfect market integration, that is the economic costs in terms of 
trade forgone when  LOOP is violated; 
2. to document the improvements in market efficiency and to estimate the gains thereof over 
time focussing on two periods, one before and one after the transatlantic telegraph. 
                                                         
An accounting framework for measuring trade forgone in disequilibrium is developed and, by 
implication, we assess the gains from improved market efficiency. For reasons that will be 
explained in section 3, word trade is used as a synonym for contract. The trade forgone is defined as 
the shortfall of traded (contracted) quantities when LOOP is violated from trade in the LOOP 
equilibrium. The intuition of the proposed framework is simple. We first determine the traded or 
contracted volume in the law of one price equilibrium at a major consumer and import market, 
Liverpool, which is supplied by a major export market, Chicago. If the price in Liverpool rises 
above the law of one price equilibrium then actual transactions, i.e. the quantities contracted, will be 
lower than in equilibrium since demand is smaller than in equilibrium (assuming a negatively 
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sloped demand curve). Quantities traded are constrained by demand. If the price in Liverpool falls 
below the equilibrium price then transactions will be constrained by a smaller supply than in 
equilibrium, given an upward sloping supply curve. The costs of disequilibrium are the losses in 
terms of contracts forgone, that is the sum of the difference over en extended period of trading 
sessions between the law of one price equilibrium and disequilibrium quantities. We do not have 
information on actual quantities but by specifying demand and supply elasticities we can determine 
an equilibrium. The forgone trade will be estimated as a proportion of the equilibrium trade. We 
implicitly assume that a shortfall in trade will affect production. 
 
We analyse wheat in two major markets, exports from Chicago to Liverpool, and over two periods, 
one pre-telegraph period 1858-62 when grain trade was lively a decade after the repeal of the 
British Corn Laws, and one period, 1883-89, when trade had stabilized at a high level. The latter 
period had access to telegraphic transmission and a specialized commercial press.5 The price data 
used in this study are collected from the contemporary press, see Appendix 1. We expect a major 
shift in market efficiency between the periods which is linked both to the expansion of trade and 
traders and because the two periods were characterized by radically different information ‘regimes’. 
You can safely assume that the efficiency of a market is linked to the access to information as long 
as there are no serious obstacles to entry into the trade.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the nature of the law of one price equilibrium is 
analyzed in an error correction model. Section 3 uses a simple diagram to illustrate the concept of a 
market exhibiting demand and supply constraints to trade and the model is then formalized. In 
section 4 the costs of imperfect market integration are assessed. Section 5 concludes. The data are 
described in Appendix 1.6
 
2. The nature of the law of one price equilibrium. 
                                                 
5 The telegraph linking Europe and North America began to operate in 1866. The second message cabled from US 
reported cotton prices. Grain exports from US were almost nil in 1866.  However, the great shift in the transatlantic 
information regime did not arrive immediately after the introduction of the telegraph but in the mid 1870’s when 
telegraph news were diffused by the press at a daily basis. It had been ideal to find time periods closer to the opening of 
the transatlantic cable. However exports of US grain almost ceased during the US Civil War and did not really pick up 
until the 1870’s.  
6 The approach taken in this paper is radically different from  Lew and Cater (2006) which estimate the impact of  
telegraph density on trade in a  regression inspired by a gravity model of international trade. They find a  positive and  
large effect of the telegraph on trade. 
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In this section we derive the definition of the law of one price, where we explicitly take into account 
the presence of transport and transaction costs.  Let  and PLP PC denote the prices in Liverpool and 
Chicago respectively. Furthermore, we also observe the transport cost, . All prices are measured 
in the same currency and units, shillings per imperial quarter. 
TcP
The law of one price adjusted for transport and transaction costs (LOOP) implies the following 
equilibrium         
( ) ( )(1 ) 1(1 )δ δ= + + ⇔ =+ +
L
L C Tc
C Tc
PP P P
P P
 
where δ measures other , that is non-observed,  transaction costs, for example commissions and 
insurance fees. This term can also reveal a high risk premium as well as quality differentials as 
revealed by price differences between the grades of wheat if they differ between the export and 
import markets. This term is assumed to be constant and proportional to the price in Chicago plus 
transport costs.  
Deviations from the LOOP- equilibrium can be expressed in terms of differences in the logarithm of 
the prices: 
( )ln ln( ) ln(( )) ln(1 )(1 ) δδ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ = − + − +⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
L
L C Tc
C Tc
P P P P
P P
. 
On the basis of deviations from the equilibrium the error correction model can be derived.  
Error correction modelling of spatial price adjustments is based on the insight that equilibrium is an 
attractor with varying degrees of power rather than a state in which economies rest. Strictly 
speaking the equilibrium price is rarely obtained and when observed it often does not last many 
trading sessions. Adjustments back to equilibrium take time and new stochastic shocks appear 
frequently. The fact that the adjustment after a shock is not instantaneous implies that markets are 
not in equilibrium during the adjustment process and trade will be constrained (relative to 
equilibrium levels) either by demand or supply. 
 
The intuition behind the error correction model is that prices in Liverpool and Chicago will react if 
there is a disequilibrium. In this case the prices will adjust such that the deviation from equilibrium 
is decreasing.  The error correction model is usually expressed in differences of log prices. Let 
. The error correction model in this version is given 
by:   
1ln ln  and ln( ) ln( )−Δ = − Δ = −L L L C Ct t t t t tp P P p P P 1−C
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where ln(1 )λ δ= + ≈ δ  and  and ε εCt Lt
LC
C
σ
σ
are error terms with are assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean zero and constant variances: 
 . 
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The parameters of the model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. This model is 
a special case of the general error correction model where the equilibrium relation is assumed 
known.7  The expected sign of the Lα  parameter is negative and it is positive forα C . 
 
The estimation results 
The model outlined above is estimated on the basis of weekly reported wheat prices in Liverpool 
and Chicago (for further details about the data, see Appendix 1). Table 1 below reports the results 
which strongly support the expectation of improved efficiency in Chicago to Liverpool trade. There 
is a marked decline in the half life of shocks from 4.2 to 1.7 weeks. While most of the adjustments 
occurred in Chicago in the early period, Liverpool took most of the adjustment in the later period. 
However, adjustments were mutual which indicate the absence of ‘market dominance’ in both 
periods and the parameters have the expected signs. Results differ a little but not significantly 
depending on whether we use transport cost data for ships over the Great Lakes or rail all the way to 
New York for shipment to Liverpool.  Tests for unit roots are in Appendix 2 and sensitivity 
analyses are  reported in  Appendix 3.  
 
Table 1- Estimates from the Error correction model applied to Chicago and Liverpool trade in 
wheat. 
 
 Chicago Chicago 
                                                 
7 For a detailed description of the error correction model see: Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry (1993)). 
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 Liverpool 
(Rail) 
Liverpool 
   
Period 1857-1862 1883-1889 
α (Chicago) 0.115* 0.123* 
 (0.053) (0.036) 
α (Liverpool) -0.038* -0.219* 
 (0.017) (0.038) 
λ  0.277* -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Half life time of a 
shock (in weeks) 
4.2 1.7 
σ (Chicago)*10-2 7.0 2.9 
σ (Liverpool)*10-2 2.1 3.0 
N 184 297 
 
 
λ is significant and positive in the first period. In fact it is much too large to indicate unobserved 
costs and a risk premium only. The background for the high value of λ has also to do with the fact 
that the quality quoted in Chicago (Spring No 2) is an inferior quality relative to the quality quoted 
in the importing market (American white). In an efficient market, and if all transport and transaction 
costs are observable and recorded, λ should be zero, which it to say that the equilibrium price 
difference between markets are due only to transport and transaction costs. This is also the result 
that we have obtained for the later period. However, a word of caution is necessary here. The 
insurance cost, around 1-2 per cent of the value of the cargo, is (probably) not included in the price 
and transport cost data we use, and if so, λ should take a positive value but close to zero. The 
explanation for this not being the case has to do with the fact that the grade quoted in Liverpool for 
most of the period was for a slightly wider denomination: in terms of grades it contains Spring No 2 
and inferior Spring wheat, compared to Chicago for which we quote Spring No 2 alone (see 
Appendix 1). That said, the λ for the second period indicates that the market was efficient. 
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Furthermore, variance in prices falls sharply for the exporting market down to the level of the 
importing market.8   
 
3. Understanding demand and supply constraints in the trans-Atlantic wheat trade. 
In the previous section we have established that prices adjust to an equilibrium determined by the 
transport and transaction cost corrected law of one price. In this section we analyse how demand 
and supply constraints can arise in the transatlantic wheat market. It is worth noting that, despite the 
fact that the exposition of the argument relies on the notion of disturbances to a given equilibrium, 
the analysis as such does allow for a market where you have shifts in supply and/or demand curves 
and thus the possibility of a sequence of equilibria over time. Figure 1 illustrates the general idea as 
stated above and applied to wheat exported from Chicago to Liverpool, two large markets which are 
assumed to represent US export supply and UK import demand respectively.  
S is the supply of Chicago wheat in Liverpool and is simply the Chicago supply curve of wheat 
shifted upwards by an amount equal to transport and transaction costs in bringing Chicago grain to 
Liverpool. D is the demand for Chicago grain in Liverpool. PP
                                                
eq  is the equilibrium price and Qeq 
is the quantity contracted at that price. Assume now a supply shock in the US shifting S to S’ 
 
S
D
Quantity  
eqP  
neqQ ndcQeqQ  
neqP
Price 
in 
Liver
pool 
S’
 
 
8  Differences in variance in importing and exporting markets are discussed at some length in Ejrnæs, Persson and Rich 
2007. 
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Figure 1. A  Shift in the Supply Curve can Generate a Transitory Period of Excess Supply 
We will then have a new equilibrium quantity, Qneq and a new equilibrium price PPneq .The estimate 
of contracts forgone in disequilibrium will be made relative to the new equilibrium quantity Qneq . 
However, it is plausible that the market does not adjust to the new equilibrium price instantaneously 
because of price rigidities, menu costs, asymmetric information etc, so let us assume that the price 
remains at Peq P  in the next trading session. At that price and given the new supply curve S’ there will 
be an excess supply since traders are willing to sell Qndc but contracts are bought at Qeq . In the 
particular example illustrated in Figure 1 the trade forgone is the difference between Qneq and Qeq.  
 
The quantities contracted on a particular market day will not necessarily equal the imports that day 
or the orders to Chicago for shipments because there are speculative inventory adjustments. For 
example, when prices rise above equilibrium sellers might mistake that for a permanent rise and 
increase their imports. However, given that the actual contracts sold will be constrained by the 
reduced demand at an above equilibrium price, inventories will build up and reduce imports at some 
future date when inventory levels will be reduced. When the price in Liverpool is below the 
equilibrium price traders might wait until the price in Chicago falls until they place orders and in 
the meantime they will reduce inventories. Over an extended period of trading sessions, say, a 
couple of years, the contracted volumes will be (approximately) equal to the actual imports in that 
extended period. The reason is that the difference in the volume of inventories between the initial 
trading session and the final market day of the trading period will be very small relative to the sum 
of the contracted volumes during the entire period.  
 
A formal model of demand and supply constraints 
Let us now turn to a formal framework for calculating the loss to contracted volumes due to supply 
and demand constraints as described above.  
We assume that the demand curve in Liverpool is given by  
 
0 1ln ln( )
D L
t tQ Pρ ρ= +   
 
where DtQ is the demand for American wheat in Liverpool and is the price of American wheat. 
L
tP
1ρ  is the price-elasticity of demand ( 1 0ρ < ). The supply of American wheat for the English 
markets is determined by the following supply function: 
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 1ln ln( )τ τ= +S Ct o tQ P  
 
where is the supply of American wheat for Liverpool, is the price of American wheat in 
Chicago. 
S
tQ
C
tP
1τ  is the price elasticity of supply ( 1 0τ > )  
 In equilibrium the price in Liverpool will be equal to the price in Chicago adjusted for transaction 
costs 
 . ( )(1 )δ= + + =L C Tc eqt t t tP P P P
tc
tP is the transport cost from Chicago to Liverpool and δ  measures additional transaction costs 
(such as port and porter charges, commissions and insurance), which are assumed to be proportional 
to the price in Chicago plus transport costs. The quantity obtained at the equilibrium price is 
denoted  ln eqtQ
 0 1 0 1ln ln( ) ln( )1
eq
eq eq Tct
t t
PQ Pρ ρ τ τ δ= + = + −+ tP . 
If the price in Liverpool exceeds the transaction corrected price in Chicago ( )(1 )δ> + +L C Tct t tP P P  
we will observe demand constraints of wheat in Liverpool and the contracted volumes will fall. The 
fall is 
 
( )
( ) (
0 1 0 1
1 1
ln ln ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )(1 )) ln( )
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ δ
− = + − +
= − = + + −
eq D eq L
t t t t
eq L C Tc L
t t t t
Q Q P P
P P P P P )t
)
 
If the changes are small the left hand side of the equation above can be interpreted as the percentage 
fall in the contracted quantity.  
On the other hand if the price in Liverpool falls below the transaction corrected price in Chicago 
( )(1 δ< + +L C Tct t tP P P  we will observe supply constraints of wheat traded in Liverpool and the 
actual volume of contracts will fall. That fall compared to equilibrium contracting can be expressed 
by 
 
0 1 0 1
1 1
ln ln ln( ) ln( )
1 1
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
1 1 1
τ τ τ τδ δ
τ τδ δ δ
⎛ ⎞− = + − − + −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛= − − − = − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
eq L
eq S Tc Tct t
t t t t
eq L L
Tc Tc C Tct t t
t t t
P PQ Q P P
P P PP P P
⎞⎟⎠t
P
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From the two equations for the fall in quantity, the key aspect is the deviation between the prices in 
Liverpool and in Chicago (corrected for transaction costs).  In the following section we will 
investigate the extent of price deviations and the implied effects on trade.    
 
4. Estimating the costs of imperfect market integration 
In order to estimate the cost of imperfect market integration we will need some estimates of supply 
and demand elasticities. What are the likely elasticities of demand and supply? There are a number 
of attempts to estimate UK and US elasticities of demand and supply (Irwin 1998, Williamson  
1980, 1990, Olson and Harris 1959) and on that basis demand elasticity is estimated to be in the 
range of 0.5 - 1 and US export supply elasticity to be between 0.5 and 1.5. While there is evidence 
that demand for food in general is inelastic, it could be argued that US wheat is a special case since 
it was a prime export quality – it sold at a premium of 5 to 10 percent relative to domestic wheat in 
Britain and for that reason elasticities might be higher than for food or wheat in general. 
 
Given estimates of demand and supply elasticities we can calculate the average fall in trade 
compared to the equilibrium. In the short run the actual import trade of US wheat might differ from 
the contracts sold for immediate and quasi-immediate delivery. However, as explained in section 3 
imported and contracted volumes will be approximately equal over an extended period since 
inventory adjustments between the initial market session and the last will be small relative to the 
traded and imported volumes. For that reason we will henceforward use the word ‘trade’ as 
synonymous with ‘contracted volume’.  The average forgone trade is calculated as:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
{demand con.} {supply con.}
1 1
{demand con.} {supply con.}
1Average foregone trade ln ln ln ln
1 ln(( )(1 )) ln( ) ln( ln( )
1
eq D eq S
t t t t
t t
L
C Tc L C Tct
t t t t t
t t
dc dc sc
Q Q Q Q
N
PP P P P P
N
n mpd n mpd
N
ρ δ τ δ
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + + − + −⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
= +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ −
sc
N
 
 
where  are the number of trading sessions with demand constraints and supply 
constraints respectively and  and 
 and dc scn n
dcmpd scmpd  are the mean price deviations when demand and 
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supply constrains.9  We display the estimates of the average loss in trade in Table 2 for two pairs of 
values of the elasticities. 
Table 2 - Estimating the forgone trade due to imperfect market integration.  
 
 Chicago Chicago 
 Liverpool 
(rail) 
Liverpool 
   
Period 1857-1862 1883-1889 
δ  0.331* -0.008 
 (0.089) (0.043) 
N 189 304 
Demand constraint 
dcn  
Mean price dev.  
 
94 
0.076 
 
159 
0.036 
Supply constraint 
scn  
Mean price dev 
 
95 
-0.076 
 
145 
-0.039 
Mean fall in 
quantity (%) 
( 1 11, 1.5ρ τ= − = ) 
 
14.8 
 
5.4 
Mean fall in 
quantity (%) 
( 1 10.5, 0.5ρ τ= − = ) 
5.7 2.1 
 
Table 2 provides an upper and lower bound estimate of the trade forgone due to deviations from 
LOOP trade. The inefficiency of the pre-telegraph transatlantic trade is apparent. It reduces    
equilibrium trade by as much as 15 per cent in the upper-bound estimate and close to six per cent in 
                                                 
9 The mean price deviations are defined as ( )
{ demand con.}
1
ln(( )(1 )) ln( )dc C Tc L
t t tdc
t
mpd P P P
n
δ
∈
= + + −∑   and 
( )
{supply con.}
1
ln( ln( )
1
L
sc C t
t tsc
t
P
mpd P P
n δ∈= − +∑ Tc−  
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the lower bound estimate.  The gain from improved market efficiency is the difference in the mean 
fall in traded quantity between periods compared. First conclusion is that the gains from increased 
market efficiency between the first and second periods are substantial in the upper bound estimate 
and clearly non-trivial in the lower bound estimate. In the upper-bound estimate the gain is 9.4  per 
cent of equilibrium trade (14.8 -5.4 = 9.4) and in the lower bound estimate it is 3.6 per cent, that is 
the difference between the mean fall in quantity  relative to equilibrium trade in the first period (5.7) 
and in the second period (2.1). 
Improvement in market efficiency matters!  
 
A counterfactual 
One way of assessing the importance of the gains in trade from the improved market efficiency is to 
design a counter-factual scenario. The actual trade is the observed value of yearly wheat exports 
from USA between 1875 and 1914 measured in current US dollars. The year 1875 is chosen as the 
starting year of the modern information regime permitting a fairly efficient spatial arbitrage. Export 
of grain in the 1875 to 1914 period is considered to represent trade at the market efficiency 
characteristics reported in Table 2 for the 1883-89 period. Imagine now that no improvement in 
market efficiency took place after the 1858-62 period, which would be a likely scenario had not the 
transatlantic telegraph been introduced. Then trade would have been smaller than the actual trade 
since there were significant improvements in market efficiency between the first and second period 
documented in Table 2. Had market efficiency remained at the 1858-62 level we can calculate 
counterfactual trade to be 3.6 per cent lower than actual trade each year in the 1875-1914 period in 
the lower-bound estimate and to be 9.4 percent lower per year in the upper-bound estimate. The 
gain from improved market efficiency is the difference between trade at the 1883-89 efficiency 
level, which is assumed to be the efficiency level of the entire 1875-1914 period in this 
counterfactual estimate, and the efficiency level of the 1858-62 period. The counter-factual question 
then is: what will the accumulated gains from improved market efficiency be like? In Figure 2 
below we present the upper-bound and lower-bound estimates.  The argument is made under the 
assumption that from the nature of the Chicago to Liverpool trade it is possible to generalise to US 
wheat exports in general, but given that the UK was the major market and London and Liverpool 
the dominating markets in Britain, that assumption is not unreasonable.  
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Figure 2. Actual US Wheat Exports and Accumulated Gains from Improved Market Efficiency, 
1875-1914 in a Lower-Bound and Upper-Bound Estimate of Market Efficiency Gains (Millions of 
US  dollars). 
 
 Source: Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics, The Americas 1750-1988, New York: Stockton Press, 1993, 
Table E 3. 
 
Figure 2 indicates that the accumulated gains from improved market efficiency in the upper bound 
estimates is equivalent to about four and a half years of average wheat exports in the period or to 
one and a half years of average exports using the lower bound estimate. Is that gain big or small?  
 
One way of addressing that question is to look for a standard.  In the conventional view transatlantic 
trade flourished in the second half of the 19th century mainly because of falling international freight 
rates (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). It makes sense therefore to assess the impact of market 
efficiency gains compared to the gains in trade attributed to falling transport costs. In this context 
the relevant way to approach transport costs is to calculate so-called freight factors, i.e. freight rates 
as a proportion of commodity prices, e.g. the cost of shipping a bushel of wheat as a proportion of 
the wheat price. Calculating freight factors is appropriate when the focus is on the trade-inhibiting 
bias of transport costs, similar to an estimate of tariffs in ad valorem terms. If freight charges fall 
the gains will be distributed between consumers and producers. Producers might catch part of the 
gains by increasing commodity prices and consumers might enjoy falling prices. If prices increase 
in the producing areas – relative to what prices would be like in the absence of falling transport 
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costs – export supply will be stimulated meeting the increased import demand due to falling prices 
in Europe. We want to know by how much. Recent estimates of the fall in the transatlantic freight 
factor for wheat shows that it fell by approximately 3.5 percentage points between 1850 and 1900, 
from ca. 10.5 to 7 percent. (Persson 2004) Almost all of that decline took place between 1875-1895. 
Imagine a case in which the falling transport costs were equally divided between producers and 
consumers. Producers would then enjoy prices about 1.75 percent higher by the end of the 19th 
century because of falling transport costs relative to a situation without transport costs reductions. 
Let us assume, for simplicity, that the entire fall in transport costs took place in one year, in 1875. 
The producers would then enjoy higher prices throughout the 1875-1914 period, compared to a case 
without transport cost reductions. However, even with a price elasticity of supply at unity the effect 
of transport costs reductions would account for only 1.75 per cent higher exports, which is about 
half the effect in the lower bound estimate of gains from improved market efficiency. 
 
5. Conclusion.  
This paper brings a number of novel insights.  
The LOOP is alive and kicking in the nineteenth-century international economy. Adjustment speed 
as measured by the half life of shocks to LOOP was not a matter of years or months but weeks, and 
it fell over time. That result underlines the need for high frequency data in historical PPP-studies. 
A method by which the costs of disequilibrium trade and, by implication, the gains from improved 
market efficiency can be measured has been developed. Gains are substantial in an upper bound 
estimate and significant in a lower bound estimate. 
Market efficiency increases over time but there seems to be a regime shift caused by changes in the 
information technology associated with the telegraph and the development of the business press. 
But are these gains big or small? It depends on the standard used. The impact of improvements in 
market efficiency compares well and even outpaces falling transport costs, which is the factor 
normally ascribed a leading role in 19th century trade expansion.  
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Appendix 1: Description of the data. 
 
Prices refer to spot transactions on the first market day every week, usually Monday, (Tuesdays in 
Liverpool) and have been converted to shillings per imperial quarter.  
Period 1858-62: Prices of Spring No.2 in Chicago is from Trade and Commerce of Chicago, 
Chicago Board of Trade Annual report, and refers to Spring No.2 except  January to June 12 1858 
when unspecified Spring. The new grading system is introduced in 1858.  Prices in Liverpool from 
Liverpool Journal and Liverpool Courier and refer to American white. Transport costs between 
Chicago and New York from Chicago Board of Trade, Annual report. Transport costs between New 
York and Liverpool from New York Times. 
Period 1883-89: Transport costs and prices in Chicago and Liverpool from the Annual Report of 
Chicago Board of Trade, Prices refer to Spring no. 2 in Chicago and  Fair to Good Spring Wheat 
(US) in Liverpool from 1883 to 1886 and from 1887  Spring  no.2. 
Exchange rates from J. Schneider et al (eds) Währungen der Welt I, Europäische und 
Nordamerikanische Devisenkurse, 1777-1914, Vol 1,Stuttgart:Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991. The 
prices are shown in Figure A1 and A2. 
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Figure A1 - The Weekly Wheat Prices in Liverpool and Chicago 1857-1862 (shillings per imperial 
quarter) 
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Figure A2 - The Weekly Wheat Prices in Liverpool and Chicago 1883-1889 (sShillings per imperial 
quarter) 
Appendix 2: Test for unit root 
Estimation of the error correction model relies on the assumption that the time series 
 are stationary processes. To examine if this is the case 
the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root (non-stationarity) is performed. In the Table below the results 
of the test are reported. 
ln , ln  and ln( ) ln( )Δ Δ − +L C L Ct t t t tP P P P PTc
Table A1: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root 
Period Time Series test-statistic Critical value 
(5% level) 
N Stationary/ 
Non-stationary 
1857-1862 Liverpool -9.10 -1.95 306 Stationary 
 Chicago -16.09 -1.95 233 Stationary 
 Equilibrium -3.52 -2.87. 176 Stationary 
1883-1889 Liverpool -22.70 -1.95 363 Stationary 
 Chicago -15.83 -1.95 341 Stationary 
 Equilibrium -7.59 -2.87 295 Stationary 
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Appendix 3: Sensitivity analyses 
The price data for Chicago has one extreme observation, May 13, 1861. We have performed the 
analyses with and without this observation. Furthermore we also have used transportation cost 
based on rail freight rates to New York as well as the Great Lakes plus canal to New York.. 
Table A2 - Estimation results from the error correction model.  
 Chicago Chicago ChicagoI  ChicagoI 
 Liverpool Liverpool 
(Rail) 
Liverpool Liverpool 
(Rail) 
     
Period 1857-1862 1857-1862 1857-1862 1857-1862 
α (Chicago) 0.131 0.115* 0.038 0.058 
 (0.077) (0.053) (0.054) (0.039) 
α (Liverpool) -0.035 -0.038* -0.037 -0.038* 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) 
λ  0.427* 0.277* 0.415* 0.269* 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) 
Half life time of a 
shock (in weeks) 
3.8 4.2 8.9 6.9 
σ (Chicago)*10-2 8.8 7.0 6.3 5.2 
σ (Liverpool)*10-2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 
N 109 184 109 182 
I The observation  for May 13 1861 is excluded 
 
Both adjustment speed and variance are affected by the extreme observation but in opposite 
directions, which means that our estimate of the trade forgone by inefficient markets, which 
depends on adjustment speed and variance, is only marginally affected, as is revealed by Table A3. 
Table A3 - Estimating the forgone trade due to imperfect market integration.  
 
 Chicago Chicago ChicagoI ChicagoI  
 Liverpool Liverpool 
(rail) 
Liverpool Liverpool 
(rail) 
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Period 1857-1862 1857-1862 1857-1862 I 1857-1862 I 
δ  0.520* 0.331* 0.523* 0.333* 
 (0.0967) (0.089) (0.096) (0.088) 
N 113 189 112 188 
Demand constraint 
dcn  
Mean price dev.  
 
55 
0.097 
 
94 
0.076 
 
54 
0.097 
 
94 
0.076 
Supply constraint 
scn  
Mean price dev 
 
58 
-0.092 
 
95 
-0.076 
 
58 
-0.090 
 
94 
-0.076 
Mean fall in 
quantity (%) 
( 1 11, 1.5ρ τ= − = ) 
 
15.5 
 
14.8 
 
15.4 
 
13.6 
Mean fall in 
quantity (%) 
( 1 10.5, 0.5ρ τ= − = ) 
5.6 5.7 5.9 5.2 
I The observation for May 13 1861 is excluded 
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